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Abstract
The classical optimal investment and consumption problem with infinite
horizon is studied in the presence of transaction costs. Both proportional
and fixed costs as well as general utility functions are considered. Weak
dynamic programming is proved in the general setting and a comparison
result for possibly discontinuous viscosity solutions of the dynamic pro-
gramming equation is provided. Detailed numerical experiments illustrate
several properties of the optimal investment strategies.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study the Merton problem with fixed and proportional transac-
tion costs. The problem introduced and solved by Merton [34] is now a classical
application of stochastic control to mathematical finance and paved the way for
decades of research on extensions to more general settings. The problem, simply
stated, is to determine the optimal investment strategy for a rational, risk-averse
agent in a market consisting of one risky asset (stock) and one riskless asset
(bank account). The latter grows at the risk-free rate, whereas the former has a
higher mean rate of return but is subject to risk in the form of volatility. Merton
found that the optimal strategy was to maintain a constant proportion of total
wealth in the risky asset. That amount, called the Merton proportion, would
depend on the market parameters as well as the investor’s risk preferences. Since
even the simplest models of a stock price assumes a (geometric) Brownian motion
driver, the investor would have to continuously rebalance his/her portfolio in
order to implement the constant proportion strategy and achieve optimal returns.
However, in the presence of transaction costs following such a strategy would
immediately lead to bankruptcy. Thus the question arises: what is the optimal
strategy when there are transaction costs?
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Arguably, the most well-known example of a transaction cost that arises in
practice is the bid-ask spread. We often refer to this cost as a proportional cost
since it accrues in proportion to the size of the trade. The first to study the
Merton problem with proportional costs were Constantinides and Magill [32]
and later again Constantinides in [9]. In these works, the notion of a buffer
region around the Merton optimal proportion within which the investor does not
re-balance his/her portfolio was first introduced. While it was not clear at the
time what the optimal strategy would have to be, they were nonetheless able
to argue that transaction costs had a profound negative impact on investment
returns. Soon after, the insights provided by these works were further developed
[13, 14, 44] to not only determine the form of the optimal strategies, but help
place the problem on firm theoretical footing. The optimal strategy in this
case is as follows: do not re-balance while the portfolio is contained inside the
buffer region. However, once the boundary of the region is breached, transact
minimally so as to remain in the region.
Proportional transaction costs have received most of the attention in the
literature for a number of reasons. First, they are relevant to investors of all
sizes. Second, from a mathematical standpoint at least, their scale invariance is
a useful property. Third, although a lot of work has been done, there are still
plenty of questions left to answer. Arguably, the most important of which is:
how does one compute the buffer region?
Partial answers to this question are provided in restricted settings. Davis
and Norman [13] showed that trading boundaries can be determined numerically
by solving a free-boundary problem. In the asymptotic limit for small costs, the
no-trade region and the corresponding utility loss can be determined explicitly at
the leading order, cf. Shreve and Soner [44], Whalley and Wilmott [48], Janeček
and Shreve [22], as well as many more recent studies [6, 18, 47, 38, 7]. Extensions
to more general preferences and stochastic opportunity sets have been studied
numerically by Balduzzi, Lynch, and Tan [30, 3, 31]. Corresponding formal
asymptotics have been determined by Goodman and Ostrov [19], Martin [33],
Kallsen and Muhle-Karbe [25, 24] as well as Soner and Touzi [47]. The last
study, [47], also contains a rigorous convergence proof for general utilities, which
is extended to several risky assets by Possamaï, Soner, and Touzi [38].
It has been determined that proportional costs lead to strategies which rely
on infinitely many small (local-time) transactions to produce optimal outcomes.
However, this theoretical result is unsatisfying from a practical point of view;
conducting infinitely many trades in any finite time horizon is impossible. On
the other hand, the inclusion of fixed costs (e.g. a brokerage fee of $1 paid each
time the investor trades) only allows for a finite number of trades over finite
time intervals. In this case using the class of strategies which are optimal for
proportional costs leads to immediate bankruptcy in the face of fixed costs (cf.
[43]). When both costs are present, the optimal strategy prescribes using two
(inner and outer) buffer regions and re-balancing happens as follows: the investor
is inactive when the portfolio is inside the outer region. Once the outer region
is breached, he/she trades to the boundary of the inner region. These cost
structures lead to strategies that are more appealing from a practical standpoint;
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now the investor must determine (a set of stopping) times at which it is optimal
to transact. The impulse control problem in the context of portfolio management
was first approached by [15].
The main drawback to fixed costs from a modeling point of view is that they
destroy the favorable scaling properties that usually allow one to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem for utilities with constant relative or absolute
risk aversion. In particular, the no-trade region is no longer a cone, even in
the simplest settings with constant investment opportunities as well as constant
absolute or relative risk aversion. Accordingly, the literature analyzing the impact
of fixed trading costs is much more limited than for proportional costs: on the
one hand, there are a number of numerical studies [42, 28], which iteratively
solve the dynamic programming equations. On the other hand, Korn [26] as well
as Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang [29] have obtained formal asymptotic results for
investors with constant absolute risk aversion. This structure resembles that of
inventory problems where both fixed and proportional costs are present. Scarf
[41] introduced the notion of K-convexity to analyze these problems in one space
dimension, which was later successfully used in [39] and [5].
For small costs, these authors find that constant trading boundaries are
optimal at the leading order. Thus, these models are tractable but do not
allow us to study how the impact of fixed trading costs depends on the size of
the investor under consideration. The same applies to the “quasi-fixed” costs
proposed by Morton and Pliska [35], and analyzed in the small-cost limit by
Atkinson and Wilmott [2]. In their model, each trade – regardless of its size –
incurs a cost proportional to the investors’ current wealth, leading to a scale-
invariant model where investors of all sizes are affected by the “quasi-fixed”
costs to the same extent. The fixed (in the sense of Morton and Pliska) and
proportional cost problem was analyzed by Irle and Sass [21, 20] in the context
of maximizing the asymptotic growth rate of the portfolio value. They show
that “constant-boundary” policies are optimal controls; these strategies dictate
that there is an inner and an outer threshold around the optimal frictionless
portfolio allocation in which the agent trades to the inner threshold when the
outer one is breached. Korn [26] considers the same transaction cost structure
as we do, i.e. fixed and proportional costs where the fixed costs are independent
of the investor’s current wealth. For the formulation and the analysis of multi-
dimensional problems we refer the reader to the book by Kabanov and Safarian
[23].
Shreve and Soner [44] were the first to provide a rigorous analysis of the value
function in the frictional (proportional cost) setting using the tools of viscosity
theory. In the mixed cost (fixed and proportional) setting, Øksendal and Sulem
[37] study the case of one risky asset and power utility with risk aversion between
0 and 1. Under some technical assumptions, they prove that the value function
is a viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman inequality and
also provide a comparison result in that case. More recently, Belak, Menkens, and
Sass [4] revisit the comparison problem in the case of proportional transaction
costs and they prove uniqueness in the case of power and logarithmic utilities.
However, the question of uniqueness for more general utilities and the analysis of
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higher dimensions and the mixed case of proportional and fixed costs remained
open. We address all these issues.
Convex duality is also used to analyse the more general semi-martingale
models. We refer the reader to the initial paper of Cvitanic and Karatzas [11],
the recent manuscript of Czichowsky and Schachermayer [12], and the references
therein.
Main themes
The results contained in this paper consist of two themes. The first is the analysis
of the value function for the general impulse control problem in multi-dimensions,
assuming constant coefficient, correlated geometric Brownian motion stock price
dynamics and general utilities with asymptotic elasticity less than 1. We do not
assume a priori measurability of the value function and we prove in Section
3.1 that it satisfies a weak dynamic programming principle (DPP). Using the
weak DPP, in Section 3.2 we prove that the value function is a constrained
viscosity solution of the associated quasi-variational Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation (dynamic programming equation, or DPE for short). Finally, we prove a
comparison principle, Theorem 4.3, for the DPE which circumvents the boundary
singularities associated with general utility functions. This result is proved for
general discontinuous sub and super solutions. The main contribution here
is a novel technique of an appropriate state-space translation of the viscosity
super-solution in order to avoid the boundary issues. Moreover, it provides a
uniqueness result, Theorem 4.4, for possibly discontinuous solutions. Since the
standard comparison would imply the continuity of the unique solution, the
statements of both Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.4 are non-standard and novel.
The second theme is to determine the shape of the asymptotic no-trade region
when there is more than one risky asset in the presence of mixed transaction costs
and/or multiple fixed costs. This includes a formal derivation of the corrector
equations obtained by homogenization of the DPE. These, in turn, correspond
to the DPE of an ergodic impulse control problem. This control problem seems
to only admit explicit solutions in either 1-D or when there are no proportional
costs. Nevertheless, we are able to calculate the optimal controls and no-trade
regions numerically using a policy iteration scheme. By appropriately modifying
the control penalization structure, we are able to investigate a diverse set of
transaction cost structures. We perform benchmark tests on the numerical
scheme using our knowledge of the explicit solutions of the 1-D models and the
fixed cost solution in 2-D.
2 Model and main results
2.1 Market, trading strategies, and wealth dynamics
Consider a financial market consisting of a safe asset earning a constant interest
rate r > 0, and d risky assets with expected excess returns µi − r > 0 and
5 Fixed and Proportional Costs
invertible infinitesimal covariance matrix σσ>:
dS0t = S
0
t rdt, dSt = Stµdt+ StσdWt,
for a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion (Wt)t≥0 defined on a filtered
probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0, P ), where (Ft)t≥0 denotes the augmentation
of the filtration generated by (Wt)t≥0. Each trade incurs a fixed transaction cost
λf > 0 and a proportional transaction cost λp ≥ 0. As a result, portfolios can only
be rebalanced finitely many times over finite time intervals, and trading strategies
can be described by pairs (τ,m), where the trading times τ = (τ1, τ2, . . .) are a
sequence of stopping times (strictly) increasing towards infinity, and the Fτi-
measurable, Rd-valued random variables collected in m = (m1,m2, . . .) describe
the transfers at each trading time. More specifically, mji represents the monetary
amount transferred from the safe to the j-th risky asset at time τi. Each trade
is assumed to be self-financing, and the costs are deducted from the safe asset
account. Thus, the safe and risky positions evolve as
(x, y) = (x, y1, . . . , yd) 7→
(
x−
d∑
j=1
(1+λpsgn(m
j
i ))m
j
i−λf , y1+m1i , . . . , yd+mdi
)
for each trade mi at time τi. The investor also consumes from the safe ac-
count at some rate (ct)t≥0. Hence, the wealth dynamics corresponding to a
consumption-investment strategy ν = (c, τ,m) starting from an initial position
(X0−, Y0−) = (x, y) ∈ R× Rd, are given by
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
(rXs − cs)ds−
∞∑
k=1
(
λf +
d∑
j=1
(1 + λpsgn(m
j
k))m
j
k
)
1{τk≤t},
Y it = y
i +
∫ t
0
Y is
dSis
Sis
+
∞∑
k=1
mik1{τk≤t}.
We write (X,Y )ν,x,y for the solution of the above equation. The solvency region
Kλ :=
{
(x, y) ∈ Rd+1 : max
{
x+ y · 1d − λp‖y‖1 − λf , min
i=1,...,d
{x, yi}
}
≥ 0
}
is the set of positions with nonnegative liquidation value. Here, 1d = (1, . . . , 1) ∈
Rd and ‖ · ‖1 denotes the Manhattan distance, namely ‖v‖1 :=
∑d
i=1 |vi|. A
visualization of this set in the case of one risky asset is given in Figure 1.
A strategy ν = (c, τ,m) starting from the initial position (x, y) is called
admissible if it remains solvent at all times: (X,Y )ν,x,yt ∈ Kλ, for all t ≥ 0, P -a.s.
The set of all admissible strategies is denoted by Θλ(x, y).
2.2 Preferences
In the above market with constant investment opportunities (r, µ, σ) and trans-
action costs λ = (λf , λp) ∈ R>0 × R≥0, an investor with utility function U and
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y
x
x+ y = λf
x+ y = λf
Kλ
y
x
x+ (1− λp)y = λf
x+ (1 + λp)y = λf
Kλ
Figure 1: With only one risky asset the solvency region is bounded by four lines,
here drawn thick. Note that in the left figure, where λp = 0, the solvency region
is unbounded for every fixed z = x + y, causing some extra obstacles in the
analysis of this special case. Note that any trade move the position parallel to
one of the two sloping lines, shifting inwards by the size of λf .
impatience rate β > 0 trades to maximize the expected utility from consumption
over an infinite horizon, starting from an initial endowment of X0− = x in
the safe and Y0− = y in the risky assets, respectively. The utility function
U : [0,∞)→ {−∞} ∪ R is real-valued, smooth, increasing, and strictly concave
on (0,∞) and has asymptotic elasticity 1− γ. We assume that U(0) = U(0+).
The value of the investor’s consumption is given by1
vλ(x, y) = sup
(c,τ,m)∈Θλ(x,y)
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtU(ct)dt
]
. (2.1)
The expected qualitative properties of an optimal strategy with one risky asset
are sketched in Figure 2.
Assumption 2.1. We shall assume throughout that
β
γ
+
(
1− 1
γ
)(
r +
(µ− r1d)>(σ>σ)−1(µ− r1d)
2γ
)
> 0.
Remark 2.2. This assumption equivalent to saying that the frictionless value
function is finite in the case where U is a power (or logarithmic) utility function
with risk-aversion parameter γ.
In fact, if U is a more general utility function with asymptotic elasticity
1−γ < 1, the value function is still finite. More precisely, for all 0 < γˆ < γ such
that the assumption holds with γ replaced by γˆ, there exist C1 and C2 such that
vλ(x, y) ≤ C1(1 + v(x, y)) ≤ C2(1 + |x+ y · 1d|1−γˆ),
1By convention, the value of the integral is set to minus infinity if its negative part is
infinite.
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x
y
Trading boundary
Target positions
Figure 2: Sample path of portfolio positions. The trader stays passive as long as
the portfolio remains in some region, and trades inwards to a target line when
the process crosses the trading boundary. The blue lines indicate movement of
the portfolio from price changes, whereas the red arcs indicate trades.
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where v here denotes the frictionless value function with power (or logarithmic)
utility function and risk-aversion parameter γˆ. This is a direct consequence of
the properties of U proven in [27].
We study the value function on its effective domain
D := {(x, y) ∈ Kλ : |vλ(x, y)| 6=∞}.
Our first result shows that it is a constrained viscosity solution of the Dynamic
Programming Equation (2.4) on its effective domain D as defined in [45, 46]; see
also the Definition 3.4, below.
Note that int(Kλ) ⊂ D. This is clear by Remark 2.2 and the observation
that for any (x, y) ∈ int(Kλ) such that a ball centered in (x, y) with radius δ
is contained in Kλ, it is admissible to liquidate with at least δ cash left and
thereafter consume the interest. This yields
vλ(x, y) ≥ U(rδ)
β
> −∞.
More precisely, the following hold:
(i) If U(0) > −∞, then Kλ = D.
(ii) If U(0+) = −∞, then {(x, y1, . . . , yd) ∈ Rd+1≥0 : x > 0} ∪ int(Kλ) = D.
Theorem 2.3. Under Assumption 2.1 the value function vλ of the Merton
problem with fixed costs λf > 0 and proportional costs λp ≥ 0 is a (possibly) dis-
continuous constrained viscosity solution of the Dynamic Programming Equation
(2.4) on its effective domain D.
Remark 2.4. The value function is indeed discontinuous in Kλ, and in the case
where U(0) > −∞ this is clearly true also in D. In the corner (λf ,0d) of ∂Kλ
the investor may decide to not trade and consume the interest rate, thus obtaining
the payoff U(rλf )/β. On the other hand, for any point (x, y) ∈ ∂Kλ \ Rd+1≥0 , the
only admissible strategy is to liquidate to (0,0d). In such cases we must have
vλ(x, y) = U(0)/β. Hence, no matter how close (x, y) is to (λf ,0d),
vλ(λf ,0d)− vλ(x, y) ≥ U(rλf )− U(0)
β
.
This value is strictly greater than 0 and independent of the choice of point.
Therefore, vλ has a discontinuity at the point (λf ,0d).
2.3 The frictional dynamic programming equation
For the convenience of the reader, we now recall how to heuristically derive the
dynamic programming equation with fixed trading costs. We start from the
ansatz that the value function vλ(x, y) for our infinite horizon problem with
constant model parameters should only depend on the positions in each of the
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assets. Evaluated along the positions Xt, Yt corresponding to any admissible
policy ν = (c, τ,m), Itô’s formula in turn yields
dvλ(Xt, Yt) (2.2)
=
(
vλx(Xt, Yt)(rXt − ct) + µ ·Dyvλ(Xt, Yt) +
1
2
Tr[σσ>Dyyvλ(Xt, Yt)]
)
dt
+Dyv
λ(Xt, Yt)
>σdWt
+
∑
τi≤t
(
vλ(Xτi −mi · 1d − λ, Yτi +mi)− vλ(Xτi , Yτi)
)
,
where
Diy = y
i ∂
∂yi
, Dijyy = y
iyj
∂2
∂yi∂yj
, i, j = 1, . . . , d.
By the martingale optimality principle of stochastic control, the utility∫ t
0
e−βsU(cs)ds+ e−βtvλ(Xt, Yt)
obtained by applying an arbitrary policy ν until some intermediate time t
and then trading optimally should always lead to a supermartingale, and to a
martingale if the optimizer is used all along. Between trades – in the policy’s
“no-trade region” – this means that the absolutely continuous drift should be
nonpositive, and zero for the optimizer. After taking into account (2.2), using
integration by parts, and canceling the common factor e−βt, this leads to
0 = sup
c>0
{
− βvλ(x, y) + U(c) + (rx− c)vλx(x, y) (2.3)
+ µ ·Dyvλ(x, y) + 1
2
Tr[σσ>Dyy]vλ(x, y)
}
.
By definition, the value function can only be decreased by admissible bulk trades
at any time:
0 ≥ sup
m∈Rd
{vλ(x−m · 1d − ‖m‖1λp − λf , y +m)− vλ(x, y)},
and this inequality should become an equality for the optimal transaction once
the boundaries of the no-trade region are breached. Combining this with (2.3)
and switching the sign yields the dynamic programming equation:
0 = min{βvλ − U˜(vλx)−L vλ, vλ −Mvλ}, (2.4)
where U˜(c˜) = supc>0(U(c)− cc˜) is the convex dual of the utility function U , the
differential operator L is defined as
L = rx
∂
∂x
+ µ ·Dy + 1
2
Tr[σσ>Dyy],
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and M denotes the non-local intervention operator
Mψ(x, y) = sup
m∈Rd
{ψ(x′, y′) : (x′, y′) = (x−m · 1d − ‖m‖1λp − λf , y +m) ∈ Kλ} .
(2.5)
In the event that there is no m ∈ Rd for which (x′, y′) = (x−m · 1d−‖m‖1λp−
λf , y +m) ∈ Kλ, then Mψ(x, y) = −∞.
3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
In this section we prove that the value function vλ is a constrained viscosity
solution of the corresponding Dynamic Programming Equation (2.4) on its
effective domain. We present a direct proof of the weak dynamic programming
principle. For a more general approach, we refer to [16]. Then, we use it to
prove that vλ is indeed a viscosity solution of (2.4).
3.1 Weak dynamic programming principle for vλ
Fix (x, y) ∈ D and M := 2(x+ y · 1d). Set
Oλ := Oλ(x, y;M) = {(x′, y′) ∈ D : x′ + y′ · 1d < M}.
Define Bδ(x, y) ⊂ Rd+1 to be a (relatively) open ball (in Kλ) of radius δ centered
at (x, y). Choose δ > 0 sufficiently small so that δ < λ, Bδ(x, y) ⊂ Oλ, and
(0, 0) /∈ Bδ(x, y). For any investment-consumption policy ν and initial endowment
(x′, y′) ∈ Bδ(x, y), define θ := θν as the exit time of the state process (X,Y )ν,x′,y′
from Bδ(x, y). Following standard convention, our notation does not explicitly
show the dependence of θ on ν. It is then clear that
(Xθ− , Yθ−) ∈ Bδ(x, y) and (Xθ, Yθ) ∈ Oλ.
Let ϕ be a bounded,2 upper-semicontinuous function on Oλ which is locally C2
at (x, y) and satisfies
vλ ≤ ϕ on Oλ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that δ > 0 was chosen small enough that
ϕ ∈ C2(Bδ(x, y)). Then, we have
vλ(x, y) ≤ sup
ν∈Θλ(x,y)
E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(ct)dt+ e−βθϕ
(
Xθ, Yθ
)]
. (3.1)
Conversely, let ϕ be a smooth function on Oλ, satisfying
vλ ≥ ϕ on Oλ.
2We can take bounded test functions because vλ is bounded from above on Oλ.
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Then, we have
vλ(x, y) ≥ sup
ν∈Θλ(x,y)
E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(ct)dt+ e−βθϕ
(
Xθ, Yθ
)]
. (3.2)
Without loss of generality, let Ω = C0([0,∞),Rd) be the space of continuous
function starting at zero, equipped with the the Wiener measure P, a standard
Brownian motion W , and the completion {Ft}t≥0 of the filtration generated by
W .
Given a control ν ∈ Θλ(x, y) and the exit time θ := θν from above, fix ω ∈ Ω
and define
νθ,ω(ω′, t) := ν
(
ω
θ⊕ ω′, t+ θ(ω)), ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0,
where
(ω
θ⊕ ω′)t =
{
ωt if t ∈ [0, θ(ω))
ω′t−θ(ω) + ωθ(ω) if t ≥ θ(ω).
We start with the proof of (3.1). By construction,
νθ,ω ∈ Θλ((Xθ(ω), Yθ(ω))ν,x,y);
in particular, νθ,ω is a well-defined impulse control. Therefore,
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtU(cνt )dt
∣∣∣∣Fθ] (ω)
=
∫ θ(ω)
0
e−βtU
(
cνt (ω)
)
dt+ e−βθ(ω)
∫
Ω
∫ ∞
0
e−βtU
(
cν
θ,ω
t (ω
′)
)
dtdP(ω′)
≤
∫ θ(ω)
0
e−βtU
(
cνt (ω)
)
dt+ e−βθ(ω)vλ((Xθ(ω), Yθ(ω))ν,x,y)
≤
∫ θ(ω)
0
e−βtU(cνt (ω))dt+ e
−βθ(ω)ϕ((Xθ(ω), Yθ(ω))ν,x,y).
As a result, for any ν ∈ Θλ(x, y):
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtU(cνt )dt
]
≤ E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(cνt )dt+ e
−βθϕ((Xθ, Yθ)ν,x,y)
]
.
By taking the supremum over all policies ν, we arrive at (3.1).
To prove (3.2), set V to be the right hand side of (3.2):
V := sup
ν∈Θλ(x,y)
E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(cνt )dt+ e
−βθϕ((Xθ, Yθ)ν,x,y)
]
.
For any η > 0, we can choose νη ∈ Θλ(x, y) satisfying
V ≤ η + E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(cν
η
t )dt+ e
−βθϕ((Xθ, Yθ)ν,x,y)
]
. (3.3)
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We begin by covering first the interior, O˚λ. For every point ζ = (x˜, y˜) in O˚λ,
set
R(ζ) := Rη(x˜, y˜)
= {(x′, y′) ∈ O˚λ : x′ > x˜, y′ > y˜, ϕ(x′, y′) < ϕ(x˜, y˜) + η}.
Since ϕ is smooth, each R(ζ) is open and
O˚λ ⊂
⋃
ζ∈Oˆλ
R(ζ).
Hence, by the Lindelöf covering lemma, we can extract a countable subcover
O˚λ ⊂
⋃
n∈N
R(ζn).
Only the boundary, ∂Kλ, remains to be covered. It is convenient to write
∂Kλ = S ∪ C,
and Oˆλ := Oλ\S where
S = {v = (v0, . . . vd) ∈ ∂Kλ : ∃i, vi < 0} (3.4)
and C is the relative complement of S in ∂Kλ. Note that this means that C
is the boundary of a (d+ 1)-simplex bounded by the coordinate axes and the
plane {v ∈ Rd+1 : v0 +∑di=1(1− λp)vi = λf}, with the open face in this plane
removed.
The interior of each k-simplex in C, for 0 < k ≤ d, can be written as
Ck(Ik) =
{
(v0, . . . , vd) ∈ Rd+1≥0 : vi > 0⇔ i ∈ Ik,
∑
i∈Ik
(1− λp1{i6=0})vi < λf
}
for some set of distinct indices Ik = {ij : j = 1, . . . , k}. For each such k-simplex,
we cover its interior using sets of the form
R(ζ) = {ζˆ ∈ Ck(i1, . . . , ik) : ζˆ > ζ, ϕ(ζˆ) < ϕ(ζ) + η}.
Clearly, each
Ck(i1, . . . , ik) ⊂
⋃
ζ∈Ck(i1,...,ik)
R(ζ)
and we can again extract a countable subcover. We remark that if U(0+) = −∞,
there is no need to create a covering of any simplex other the ones with non-
trivial first coordinate component (since any other simplex is not contained in
the effective domain of vλ). If instead, U(0) > −∞, then we need to cover
everything. Finally, note that we also do not need to cover S because, provided
η is sufficiently small, an η-optimal strategy νη will force (Xθ, Yθ)ν
η,x,y /∈ S.
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So far we have created a countable covering {R(ζn)}∞n=d+2 (up to re-indexing)
of Oˆλ\{λfe0, λf1−λp e1, . . .
λf
1−λp ed,0d+1}, where ei denotes the i-th elementary
unit vector in Rd+1 with indexing starting at 0. For each i = 1, . . . , d, set
ζi :=
λf
1−λp ei. Then set ζ0 = λfe0 and ζd+1 = 0d+1. Finally, define R(ζi) := {ζi}
for 0 ≤ i ≤ d+ 1. Thus we have a countable covering {R(ζn)}∞n=0 of Oˆ.
Now, define a mapping I : Oˆλ → N:
I(x′, y′) := min{n : (x′, y′) ∈ R(ζn)}, ∀(x′, y′) ∈ Oˆλ
and set
ζ(x′, y′) := ζI(x′,y′),
By definition, these constructions imply
ϕ(x′, y′) ≤ ϕ(ζ(x′, y′))+ η, ∀ (x′, y′) ∈ Oˆλ. (3.5)
For each n ∈ N, we choose a control νn ∈ Θλ(ζn) so that
vλ(ζn) ≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtU(cν
n
t )dt
]
+ η. (3.6)
Note that for each n ≥ 0, νn ∈ Θλ(x′, y′) for every (x′, y′) ∈ R(ζn). We now
define a composite strategy ν∗, which follows the policy νη satisfying (3.3) until
the corresponding state process (X,Y )ν
η,x,y leaves Bδ(x, y) at time θ = θν
η
.
We have already argued that (Xθ, Yθ)ν
η,x,y ∈ Oˆλ. The policy thereafter is νn
corresponding to the index n which the state process is assigned by the mapping
I:
ν∗(ω
θ⊕ ω′, t) :=
{
νη(ω, t), if t ∈ [0, θ(ω)],
νN (ω)(ω′, t− θ(ω)), if t > θ(ω),
with N (ω) = I((Xθ(ω), Yθ(ω))νη,x,y). This construction ensures that we have
ν∗ ∈ Θλ(x, y). Hence, it follows from the definitions of the value function and
ν∗, (3.6) and vλ ≥ ϕ (which holds by definition of ϕ), as well as (3.5) and (3.3)
that
vλ(x, y) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtU
(
cν
∗
t
)
dt
]
= E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU (cηt ) dt+ e
−βθ
∫ ∞
0
e−βtU
(
cNt
)
dt
]
≥ E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(cηt )dt+ e
−βθ(ϕ(ζ((Xθ, Yθ)ν
η,x,y))− η)
]
≥ E
[∫ θ
0
e−βtU(cηt )dt+ e
−βθ(ϕ((Xθ, Yθ)ν
η,x,y)− 2η)
]
≥ V− 3η.
Since η was arbitrary this establishes (3.2), thereby completing the proof.
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3.2 vλ is a viscosity solution of (2.4)
We first state and prove some facts about the intervention operator M from (2.5),
which are needed in the subsequent proofs. Throughout, ψ∗ and ψ∗ will denote
the lower and upper-semicontinuous envelopes of a locally bounded function ψ,
respectively.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose λf , λp > 0. Let ϕ : Kλ → R. Then
(i) If ϕ is upper semi-continuous, then Mϕ is upper semi-continuous.
(ii) If ϕ is continuous, then Mϕ is continuous.
Proof. The proof can be found in [37]
Remark 3.2. When λp = 0, the above lemma is no longer true. To see where
the argument breaks down consider the smooth function h on R2+ defined by
h(x, y) =

h0(x− y), x+ y > 2
htan(pi(2−x−y))(x− y), 1 < x+ y ≤ 2
0, x+ y ≤ 1.
where hζ : R → [0, 1] is the standard smooth bump function centered at ζ,
i.e. with peak hζ(ζ) = 1. Suppose that λf = 1. Consider the sequence ζn :=
(1 + 1n , 1 +
1
n )→ (1, 1). Then, lim supn→∞Mh(ζn) = 1 > 0 = Mh(1, 1) which
demonstrates that upper-semicontinuity is not preserved by M. Compactness of
iso-wealth lines, however, would preclude us from pushing bumps out to infinity.
The following lemma is needed in the case when λf > 0 and λp = 0. A
fundamental difficulty arises in the pure fixed cost case as the set of attainable
portfolios at a fixed wealth level is no longer compact as it was in the case when
λf > 0 and λp > 0.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose ϕ : Kλ → R satisfies supz∈K ‖ϕ(z, ·)‖∞ < ∞ for any
non-empty compact set K ⊂ R+.
(i) If ϕ is lower semi-continuous, then Mϕ is lower semi-continuous. In
particular, if ϕ ≥Mϕ, then ϕ∗ ≥Mϕ∗.
(ii) Let ϕ ∈ C1(Kλ). If (z, ξ) 7→ Dξϕ(z, ξ) is compactly supported on C × Rd
for any compact set C ⊂ R+, then Mϕ is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. See [1] for the proof.
The following definition in an adaptation of the one given in [45, 46] to the
current problem. The main difference between the classical viscosity solution
and the one below is that for a constrained solution the sub-solution property
extends to the closed domain D.
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Definition 3.4. We say that u is a viscosity subsolution on D if for each ζ0 ∈ D
and for every upper-semicontinuous function ϕ such that ϕ is locally C2 at ζ0
and 0 = (u∗ − ϕ)(ζ0) = maxζ∈D(u∗ − ϕ)(ζ) there holds
min
{
βϕ(ζ0)− U˜(ϕx(ζ0))−Lϕ(ζ0), (ϕ−Mϕ)∗(ζ0)
}
≤ 0.
We say that u is a viscosity supersolution on D˚ if for each ζ0 ∈ D˚ and every
smooth ϕ such that 0 = (u∗ − ϕ)(ζ0) = minζ∈D˚(u∗ − ϕ)(ζ) there holds
min
{
βϕ(ζ0)− U˜(ϕx(ζ0))−Lϕ(ζ0), (ϕ−Mϕ)(ζ0)
}
≥ 0.
We say that u is a constrained viscosity solution on D, if it is a subsolution on
D and a supersolution in D˚.
Remark 3.5. In the given definition of viscosity subsolutions we have chosen a
relaxation of the conditions on the test functions, letting them be merely upper-
semicontinuous outside of some neighborhood. This is needed in the proof of
Theorem 4.3, due to the global behavior of the operator M.
Remark 3.6. When both λf , λp > 0, then the equations are continuous, i.e.
the lower envelope of the equation for viscosity subsolutions is not needed. The
reason is that the operator M preserves upper-semicontinuity, in other words,
the quantity in the equation is already lower semicontinuous.
We are now ready to tackle the proof of Theorem 2.3, which we split into
two lemmata:
Lemma 3.7. The value function vλ is a viscosity supersolution of the Dynamic
Programming Equation (2.4) on D˚.
Proof. Let (x0, y0) ∈ D˚. and let ϕ be a smooth function onOλ := Oλ(x0, y0; 2(x0+
y0 · 1d)) satisfying
0 = (vλ∗ − ϕ)(x0, y0) = min{(vλ∗ − ϕ)(x′, y′) : (x′, y′) ∈ Oλ}.
Using Lemma 3.3 and the inequality vλ∗ ≥ ϕ on Oλ we obtain
ϕ(x0, y0) = v
λ
∗ (x0, y0) ≥Mvλ∗ (x0, y0) ≥Mϕ(x0, y0).
Therefore, it remains to show that(
βϕ− U˜(ϕx)−Lϕ
)
(x0, y0) ≥ 0.
Assume to the contrary that(
βϕ− U(c∗) + c∗ϕx −Lϕ
)
(x0, y0) < 0,
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for some c∗ > 0, and set φ(x, y) := ϕ(x, y)− (|x− x0|4 + ‖y − y0‖4). Then, for
 > 0 and r > 0 small enough, continuity yields(
βφ− U(c∗) + c∗φx −L φ
)
(x, y) < 0, ∀(x, y) ∈ Br(x0, y0) ⊂ Oλ.
Select a convergent sequence of points (xn, yn, vλ(xn, yn))→ (x0, y0, vλ∗ (x0, y0))
and denote by (Xnt , Y nt ) := (Xt, Yt)xn,yn the portfolio process starting at (xn, yn)
under the consumption-only strategy ct ≡ c∗. Define
Hn := inf{t ≥ 0 : (Xnt , Y nt ) /∈ Br(x0, y0)}
and note that lim infn→∞ E[Hn] > 0. Hence, there exists δ > 0 such that
E[e−βHn ] > δ, for all n sufficiently large. Itô’s formula gives
φ(xn, yn)
= E
[
e−βH
n
φ(XnHn , Y
n
Hn) +
∫ Hn
0
e−βs(βφ+ c∗φx −L φ)(Xns , Y ns )ds
]
≤ E
[
e−βH
n
φ(XnHn , Y
n
Hn) +
∫ Hn
0
e−βsU(c∗)ds
]
.
By construction of φ, there exists η > 0 such that we have ϕ ≥ φ + η on
Oλ\Br(x0, y0). Hence:
φ(xn, yn) ≤ E
[
e−βH
n
ϕ(XnHn , Y
n
Hn) +
∫ Hn
0
e−βsU(c∗)ds
]
− δη.
Taking into account (vλ − φ)(xn, yn)→ 0, we note that for n large enough
vλ(xn, yn) ≤ E
[
e−βH
n
ϕ(XnHn , Y
n
Hn) +
∫ Hn
0
e−βsU(c∗)ds
]
− δη
2
.
This contradicts the weak dynamic programming principle (3.2) for vλ, thereby
completing the proof.
The image of an arbitrary smooth function under M is upper semicontinuous
only under additional assumptions (compare 3.3(ii)). As is customary in the
theory of viscosity solutions (cf., e.g., section 9 of [10]), the viscosity subsolution
property in the following lemma is therefore formulated in terms of the lower
semicontinuous envelope of the DPE:
Lemma 3.8. The value function vλ is a viscosity subsolution of
min
{
βvλ − U˜(vλx)−L vλ, (vλ −Mvλ)∗
}
= 0 on D.
Proof. Step 1. Throughout the proof, C > 0 denotes a generic constant that may
vary from line to line. We argue by contradiction. Let (x0, y0) ∈ D and let ϕ
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be an upper-semicontinuous and bounded function on Oλ(x0, y0; 2(x0 + y0 · 1d))
which is locally C2 at (x0, y0) and satisfies
0 = ((vλ)∗ − ϕ)(x0, y0) = max{((vλ)∗ − ϕ)(x′, y′) : (x′, y′) ∈ Oλ}.
Suppose that for some η > 0, we have
min{βϕ−Lϕ− U˜(ϕx), (ϕ−Mϕ)∗}(x0, y0) > η.
By lower semi-continuity, there is a small rectangular neighborhood
N = N(x0, y0, ρ) :=
{
(x, y) ∈ Oλ : max
i=1,...,d
{|x− x0|, |yi − yi0|} < ρ
}
on which ϕ is C2 and satisfies
min{βϕ−Lϕ+ cϕx − U(c), ϕ−Mϕ}(x, y) > η, (3.7)
for all c > 0, (x, y) ∈ N.
Step 2. Choose a sequence N 3 (xn, yn) → (x0, y0) for which vλ(xn, yn)
converges to (vλ)∗(x0, y0). At each of these points choose a 1n -optimal control
νn ∈ Θλ(xn, yn). We denote by cnt and τn the consumption process and the first
impulse time of νn, respectively, and write (Xnt , Y nt ) := (Xt, Yt)ν
n,xn,yn for the
corresponding controlled process. Denote by (Ξnt ) ∈ R2 the same process, but
without trading, i.e., the process starting at (xn, yn) and with consumption cn.
Define the stopping times
Hn := inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξnt /∈ N} ∧ 1,
and
θn := Hn ∧ τn.
We can further decompose Hn = Hn ∧Hn ∧ 1, where
Hn := inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξnt ∈ ∂N ∩ {x0 − ρ} × Rd},
and
H
n
:= inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξnt ∈ ∂N ∩ {x : x > x0 − ρ} × Rd}.
The stopping time H
n
captures exit by diffusion and Hn represents exit by
consumption.
Step 3. Write
h(c, x, y) := I(c, x, y)− sup
cˆ>0
I(cˆ, x, y),
where
I(c, x, y) := −βϕ(x, y) +Lϕ(x, y)− cϕx(x, y) + U(c).
Note that I(c, x, y) < 0 for all c ∈ R+ and (x, y) ∈ N by (3.7). Setting
c∗(x, y) = (U ′)−1(ϕx(x, y)), it follows that
h(c, x, y) = I(c, x, y)− I(c∗(x, y), x, y) ≤ 0.
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By smoothness of ϕ and c∗ and compactness of N , there exists Lρ > 0 with
|I(c∗(x, y), x, y)| ≤ Lρ, for all (x, y) ∈ N. On the other hand, there is α > 0 such
that I(c, x, y) ≤ −αc, for all c > 0. This leads to the upper bound
h(c, x, y) ≤ (−αc+ Lρ) ∧ 0, for all c > 0, (x, y) ∈ N. (3.8)
As we only consider times t up to θn, we can assume without loss of generality
that cnt = c∗(Xnt , Y nt ) for t ∈ (θn, Hn]. Together with (3.8) we obtain
E
[∫ θn
0
−e−βth(cnt , Xt, Yt)dt
]
= E
[∫ Hn
0
−e−βth(cnt , Xt, Yt)dt
]
≥ CαE
[∫ Hn
0
e−rtcnt dt
]
− LρE[Hn].
≥ CαE
[∫ θn
0
e−rtcnt 1{θn=Hn}dt
]
−LρE[Hn], (3.9)
where the first inequality uses (3.8) and changes the discount factor.
Step 4. Set ζnt := (Xnt , Y nt ). Weak dynamic programming (3.1) implies
vλ(xn, yn) ≤ 1
n
+ E
[∫ θn
0
e−βtU(cnt )dt+ e
−βθnϕ(ζnθn)
]
≤ 1
n
+ ϕ(xn, yn) + E
[∫ θn
0
e−βtI(cnt , ζ
n
t )dt
]
+ E
[
e−βθ
n
(ϕ(ζnθn)− ϕ(ζnθn−))1{θn=τn}
]
≤ 1
n
+ ϕ(xn, yn) + E
[∫ θn
0
e−βtI(c∗t (ζ
n
t ), ζ
n
t )dt
]
+ E
[∫ θn
0
e−βth(cnt , ζ
n
t )dt
]
− CηP[θn = τn]
≤ 1
n
+ ϕ(xn, yn)− CLρηE[θn]− CηP[θn = τn]
+ E
[∫ θn
0
e−βth(cnt , ζ
n
t )dt
]
.
Since vλ(xn, yn)− ϕ(xn, yn)− 1n → 0 as n → ∞ and since the other terms on
the right-hand side are negative, they must each vanish as n tends to infinity.
Step 5. We derive a contradiction using that
lim
n→∞max
{
E[θn] , P[θn = τn] , E
[∫ θn
0
−e−βth(cnt , ζnt )dt
]}
= 0. (3.10)
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It will be useful to have E[Hn] → 0 and P[θn = Hn] → 1. To prove these
statements, first observe that
1 = P[θn = Hn] + P[θn = τn]− E[1{θn=Hn}1{θn=τn}]
where E[1{θn=Hn}1{θn=τn}]→ 0. This implies that P[θn = Hn]→ 1. In addition,
E[θn] =
∫
{θn=Hn}
HndP+
∫
{θn 6=Hn}
θndP,
where
∫
{θn=Hn} θ
ndP→ 0. This implies
E[Hn]−
∫
{θn 6=Hn}
HndP→ 0.
Since |Hn| ≤ 1 by definition and since P[θn 6= Hn] → 0 according to the
observations above, we obtain E[Hn]→ 0. The statement that P[θn = Hn]→ 1
follows the fact that Hn = H
n ∧Hn ∧ 1→ 0 and Hn is the exit time from N of
a diffusion process started at (xn, yn)→ (x0, y0).
Step 6. As a consequence, if (x0, y0) is an interior point of D and ρ chosen
small enough,
E
[∫ θn
0
e−rtcnt 1{θn=Hn}dt
]
→ ρ,
which follows from the simple observation that, for any fixed n, the term inside
the expectation represents the amount of discounted consumption needed for
cash in the bank account to decrease from xn to x0 − ρ.
However by (3.10) and (3.9), we must have
0 = lim
n→∞E
[∫ θn
0
−e−βth(ct, Xt, Yt)dt
]
≥ Cαρ− Lρ lim
n→∞E[H
n] = Cαρ > 0,
which is a contradiction.
Step 7. In the case U(0) > −∞, we need to discuss the solution at the
boundary. Note that if (x0, y0) ∈ ∂Kλ \ S = Kλ ∩ Rd+1≥0 (recall (3.4)), then it is
immediate from dynamic programming that
βϕ(x0, y0)− U˜(ϕx)(x0, y0)−Lϕ(x0, y0) = 0.
Suppose (x0, y0) ∈ S. We require that ϕ is taken so that Lemma 3.3 (ii) applies.
Note that the previous steps of the proof are agnostic to this requirement. If
(vλ)∗(x0, y0) = vλ(x0, y0), then
(ϕ−Mϕ)(x0, y0) ≤ ϕ(x0, y0)−Mvλ(x0, y0)
= vλ(x0, y0)− vλ(0d+1) = 0,
since the only admissible control at (x0, y0) is liquidation.
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On the other hand, if (vλ)∗(x0, y0) 6= vλ(x0, y0), then suppose by way of
contradiction that
min{βϕ−Lϕ− U˜(ϕx), (ϕ−Mϕ)∗}(x0, y0) > η,
for some η > 0. Repeat Steps 1–5 with a sufficiently small ρ and the stopping
times Hn and H
n
re-defined to be
Hn = inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξnt ∈ ∂N ∩ S}
and
H
n
= inf{t ≥ 0 : Ξnt ∈ ∂N \ S}.
Repeating these steps is possible since vλ is non-decreasing in each argument,
and the sequence in Step 2 can therefore be contained in the interior of D. Note
that at time Hn, the process is in S, where the only admissible control is to trade
to the origin. Hence, τn ≤ Hn, and thus also τn = θn on the set {θn = Hn}.
By Step 5, this implies
0 = lim
n→∞P[θ
n = τn] = lim
n→∞P[θ
n = Hn] = 1,
which is clearly a contradiction. Thus,
min{βϕ−Lϕ− U˜(ϕx), (ϕ−Mϕ)∗}(x0, y0) ≤ 0,
which is the desired inequality.
4 Comparison
In this section, we assume that λf > 0 and λp ≥ 0 and we are now considering
more general utility functions.
Proposition 4.1. Let U be an increasing, smooth, strictly concave utility func-
tion on R+. Then its Legendre-Fenchel transform, defined by
U˜(c˜) := sup
c>0
{U(c)− cc˜}, c˜ ∈ R,
is decreasing.
Proof. A simple calculus argument shows that
d
dc˜
U˜(c˜) = −(U ′)−1(c˜) < 0,
where the negativity follows by the assumptions on U .
We now aim to reformulate the definition of the intervention operator M so
as to algebraically manipulate the strategies. For each ζ ∈ D, we define the sets
I(ζ) := {ν = (m1 −
d+1∑
i=2
λp|mi| − λf ,m2, . . . ,md+1) :
d+1∑
i=1
mi = 0, ζ + ν ∈ D}.
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Then, the intervention operator satisfies
Mψ(ζ) = sup
ν∈I(ζ)
{ψ(ζ + ν)}.
By convention, if I(ζ) = ∅, then Mψ(ζ) = −∞.
Lemma 4.2. If ζ ≤ ζˆ, then I(ζ) ⊂ I(ζˆ).
Proof. If I(ζ) = ∅, then the assertion is trivially true. Otherwise, if there exists
ν ∈ I(ζ). Since 0 ≤ (ζ + ν) · 1d+1 < (ζˆ + ν) · 1d+1, it follows that ζˆ + ν ∈ D.
Hence ν ∈ I(ζˆ)
Theorem 4.3. Let u be an upper-semicontinuous sub-solution on D, and v be
a lower-semicontinuous super-solution in D˚ and set α := (α, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rd+1
for some α > 0. Suppose that u and v are non-decreasing in the variables
(x, y1, . . . , yd). If
inf
η∈D\D˚
v(η + α) > −∞ (4.1)
and if there exists some γˆ ≤ γ large enough to also satisfy Assumption 2.1 as
well as a C > 0 such that
u(x, y) ≤ C(1 + |x+ y · 1d|1−γˆ), ∀(x, y) ∈ D˚, (4.2)
then u(η) ≤ v(η + α), for all η ∈ D.
Before presenting the proof, let us state the theorem describing the relevance
to vλ and how it relates to comparison:
Theorem 4.4. Let u and v be two constrained viscosity solutions, both satisfying
(4.1) and (4.2) for all α > 0. Then
(i) u∗(η) = v∗(η) for all η ∈ D.
(ii) u∗(η) = v∗(η) for all η ∈ D˚.
In particular, the value function vλ satisfies these conditions whenever the
asymptotic elasticity of the utility function U is smaller than 1.
Proof. We begin by proving the following:
u∗(η) ≤ (v∗)∗(η) and v∗(η) ≤ (u∗)∗(η) ∀η ∈ D (4.3)
as well as
(u∗)∗(η) ≤ v∗(η) and (v∗)∗(η) ≤ u∗(η) ∀η ∈ D˚. (4.4)
Theorem 4.3 holds for u∗ and v∗ as u and v, respectively. Thus,
u∗(η) ≤ lim sup
α→0
v∗(η + α) ≤ (v∗)∗(η),
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for any choice of η ∈ D. Similarly, for η ∈ D˚,
v∗(η) ≥ lim inf
α→0
u∗(η − α) ≥ (u∗)∗(η).
Interchanging u and v above, we obtain the other halves of the statements.
Employing (4.3) twice yields
u∗ ≤ (v∗)∗ ≤ v∗ ≤ (u∗)∗ ≤ u∗,
implying u∗ = v∗ on D. Moreover, by (4.4),
v∗ ≥ (u∗)∗ ≥ u∗ ≥ (v∗)∗ ≥ v∗,
implying v∗ = u∗ in D˚.
Finally, by Assumption 2.1 and the following Remark 2.2, condition (4.2) is
satisfied for vλ. Now choose any α > 0. Then, for any η ∈ D ⊂ Kλ,
vλ(η + α) ≥ vλ(α) ≥ U(rα)
β
> −∞,
which follows from the definition of Kλ and by choosing the consumption to be
the interest rα. Hence, (4.1) is also satisfied.
Note that if u is a viscosity solution satisfying (4.1) and (4.2), but not
necessarily for all α > 0, the same type of argument as in the proof yields
u∗(η) ≤ (vλ)∗(η), ∀η ∈ D
and
u∗(η) ≤ (vλ)∗(η), ∀η ∈ D˚.
This theorem also justifies the slightly unorthodox statement of comparison in
Theorem 4.3. Indeed, a traditional comparison formulation would always imply
that the constrained viscosity solutions are unique and therefore continuous.
Hence, vλ is truly discontinuous, so a traditional comparison formulation cannot
be expected. Therefore, the above uniqueness result is the best one could prove,
as the viscosity solutions do not distinguish the semi-continuous envelopes.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Step 1. We just prove the comparison theorem for the
case of pure fixed costs (λf > 0, λp = 0). In the case when both λf , λp > 0, the
solvency region is compact for all fixed wealth levels z. This compactness is
lost when λp = 0 and the proof in the case of pure fixed costs is in fact more
complicated (and can easily be carried over to the more general transaction costs
case, mutatis mutandis). We will abuse notation and write λ := λf .
Step 2. Suppose by way of contradiction that u(η0)− v(η0 + α) > 0 at some
point η0 ∈ D. Note that if η0 ∈ ∂D, then u(η0) > −∞. Take any γ′ < min{γˆ, 1}
and choose  > 0 small enough so that u(η0)− v(η0 + α)−(z(η0 + α))1−γ′ > 0,
where z(η) := η · 1d+1. Set
Ψι(η, ξ; γ′) := u(η)− v(ξ + α)− (z(ξ + α))1−γ′ − 1
2
ι|η − ξ|2.
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Observe that due to the growth restrictions (4.2) on u and the finiteness assump-
tion on v, we have Ψι(η, ξ; γ′) → −∞ uniformly in η as |ξ| → ∞. As a result,
there exists L := L(γ′) > 0 such that whenever ξˆ ∈ D satisfies z(ξˆ + α) > L,
then Ψι(η, ξˆ; γ′) < 0 for all η ∈ D. This construction compactifies the problem
in the wealth direction, however maximizers of Ψι(η, ξ; γ′) may not exist since
the strip {η′ ∈ D : z(η′ + α) ≤ L} is not compact in the case when there are
no proportional costs (i.e. λp = 0).
Step 3. The conditions on u and v imply that supη,ξ∈DΨι(η, ξ; , γ′) <∞.
Consequently, there exists a maximizing sequence of points (ηj , ξj) ∈ D×D for
which Ψι(ηj , ξj ; γ′)→ supη,ξ∈DΨι(η, ξ; γ′) as j →∞. Let us introduce a smooth
bump function hj : D → R such that its peak satisfies hj(ξj + α) = 1 and its
support is contained in a relatively open ball in D of radius r < 12 min{α, λ}.
The bump function hj then satisfies a simple C2 estimate
|βh−L h| ≤ c‖hj‖C2(D),
for some generic constant c > 0 depending on the market parameters and r.
Define
δj :=
3
2
(
sup
η,ξ∈D
Ψι(η, ξ; γ′)−Ψι(ηj , ξj ; γ′)
)
.
Clearly, δj > 0 and δj → 0 as j →∞. Finally, let us observe that
Ψι,δj (η, ξ; γ′) := Ψι(η, ξ; γ′) + δjhj(ξ + α)
has a maximizer, say (ηˆj , ξˆj), which is near (ηj , ξj). We will forego the additional
notation and just assume the maximum is at (ηj , ξj).
Step 4. We now construct a strict super-solution on the domain Dα,L(γ′) :=
{ξ ∈ D : α ≤ z(ξ) < L(γ′)}. We claim that provided 0 < γˆ − γ′ is sufficiently
small, then for all  > 0 and j sufficiently large, the function v,δj (ξ) := v(ξ) +
(z(ξ))1−γ
′ − δjhj(ξ) is a strict super-solution of the dynamic programming
equation on Dα,L(γ′) ∩ D˚. Let ϕ be a smooth test function touching v from
below at some point ξˆ. Let us write g(ξ) := (z(ξ))1−γ
′
. We begin by stating
a few facts about g. First, note that by the finiteness criterion for the Merton
value function, given in Assumption 2.1, for γ′ sufficiently close to min{γˆ, 1}
there exists ρ1 := ρ1(α,L(γ′)) > 0 such that
βg(ξ)−L g(ξ) > ρ1, ∀ξ ∈ Dα,L(γ′).
We fix such a γ′ for the rest of the proof and will shortly suppress it from the
notation. Next, it is also clear that
∂x(g(ξ)− δjhj(ξ)) > 0, holds for all ξ ∈ Dα,L(γ′)
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provided j is sufficiently large (i.e. δj sufficiently small). Then
β(ϕ+ g − δjhj)−L (ϕ+ g − δjhj)− U˜(ϕx + ∂x(g − δjhj))
= βϕ−Lϕ− U˜(ϕx) + (βg −L g)− δj(βhj −L hj)
+ U˜(ϕx)− U˜(ϕx + ∂x(g − δjhj))
≥ (βg −L g)− δjc‖h‖C2
≥ ρ1
2
, for j sufficiently large.
Finally, we show that there exists ρ2 := ρ2(α,L(γ′)) > 0 such that v,δj −
Mv,δj ≥ 12ρ2 on Dα,L(γ′). Indeed,
v,δj −Mv,δj = v + g − δjhj −M(v + g − δjhj)
≥ v −Mv + (g −Mg)− δjhj −M(−δjhj)
≥  inf
ξ∈Dα,L(γ′)
(g −Mg)(ξ)− δjhj
≥ ρ2 − δjc‖hj‖C2
≥ 1
2
ρ2, for j sufficiently large.
Setting ρ := min{ρ1, ρ2}3 completes this step of the proof.
Step 5. We now make a few observations about the behavior of Ψι,δj (η, ξ) :=
Ψι,δj (η, ξ; γ′) and its implications. From now on, we fix j large enough so
that all relevant bounds hold. We also drop the indices altogether and assume
δ := δ(ι) ∈ o(ι−1). Recall the function Ψι(η, ξ) = u(η)− v,δ(ξ + α)− 12 ι|η − ξ|2
achieves a maximum mι at (ηι, ξι) ∈ D×D. By standard arguments
lim
ι→∞ ι|ηι − ξι|
2 → 0
and
mι ↘ m := sup
η∈D
{u(η)− v,0(η + α)} > 0.
Step 6. Write
F (x, y, w, p,X) := βw − rxp1 −
d∑
i=1
µiyipi+1 − 1
2
Tr[σ(y)σ(y)>X]− U˜(p1),
where we write σ(y)σ(y)> instead of σσ>Dyy to emphasize the y argument
more explicitly in the calculations. Since u is a sub-solution and v,δ is a
super-solution, the Crandall-Ishii lemma yields
(ηι, u(ηι), pι, Xι) ∈ J2,+u(ηι)
3Note that while γ′ increases up to γˆ, so might L(γ′) increase to infinity. However, in each
case L(γ′) is finite and all of the inequalities continue to hold for any γ′ chosen large enough.
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and
(ξι + α, v
,δ(ξι + α), pι, Yι) ∈ J2,−v,δ(ξι + α).
Naturally, there corresponds a test function ϕι ≥ u to (ηι, u(ηι), pι, Xι) ∈
J2,+u(ηι) which touches u at ηι and is C2 in a neighborhood of ηι. We claim
that (ϕι −Mϕι)∗(ηι) ≤ 0 as ι→∞. If this is not the case, then we use the fact
that u is a sub-solution, v,δ is a super-solution, and that ξι + α ∈ D˚ to obtain
0 ≥ F (ηι, u(ηι), pι, Xι)− F (ξι + α, v,δ(ξι + α), pι, Yι)
= βu(ηι)− rx(ηι)p1ι −
d∑
i=1
µiyi(ηι)p
i+1
ι −
1
2
Tr[σ(y(ηι))σ(y(ηι))
>Xι]− U˜(p1ι )
− βv,δ(ξι + α) + rx(ξι + α)p1ι +
d∑
i=1
µiyi(ξι + α)p
i+1
ι
+
1
2
Tr[σ(y(ξι + α))σ(y(ξι + α))
>Yι] + U˜(p1ι )
≥ β(u(ηι)− v,δ(ξι + α))− 1
2
Tr[σ(y(ηι))σ(y(ηι))
>Xι − σ(y(ξι))σ(y(ξι))>Yι]
≥ β(u(ηι)− v,δ(ξι + α))− 3ι|ηι − ξι|2Lσ
≥ 1
2
β(u(ηι)− v,δ(ξι + α)) > 0, for all ι sufficiently large,
which yields a contradiction. Thus, (ϕι −Mϕι)∗(ηι) ≤ 0 as ι→∞.
Step 7. We again consider the test function ϕι from the previous step. In this
step, we aim to modify the test function ϕι so as to obtain a favorable inequality
involving u. To begin with, note that there exists a net {ηι,k(ι)}ι ⊂ D such that
|ηι − ηι,k(ι)| = o(ι−1) and
ϕι(ηι)−Mϕι(ηι,k(ι)) ≤ o(ι−1).
Consequently, I(ηι,k(ι)) 6= ∅. we may modify ϕι in the following manner. Let r˜ >
0 be sufficiently small so that ϕι is C2 in the ball Br˜(ηι) where r˜ < 12 max{λ, |ηι|}.
Let Rr˜(ηι) := {η ∈ Br˜(ηι) : I(η) 6= ∅}.
Consider the set
I(Rr˜(ηι)) := {ζ + ν : ζ ∈ Rr˜(ηι), ν ∈ I(ζ)}.
Note that by construction the Hausdorff distance between Rr˜(ηι) and I(Rr˜(ηι)) is
positive. Let {ζt}t∈R ⊂ Rr˜(ηι) be any continuum of points such that z(ζs) < z(ζt)
for s < t and I({ζt}t∈R) = I(Rr˜(ηι)). Define the function
ϕˆι(ζ) =
{
ϕι on D\I(Rr˜(ηι))
(Mu)∗(ζt) on I(ζt),∀t ∈ R.
Redefining ϕι so that ϕι = ϕˆ∗ι preserves its local properties at ηι, maintains
upper-semicontinuity globally, and ensures Mϕι(ηι,k(ι)) = (Mϕι)∗(ηι,k(ι)) =
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(Mu)∗(ηι,k(ι)). The first equality follows by the fact that Mϕι is upper-semi-
continuous (since ϕι is upper semi-continuous) and the second from the definition
of ϕι. This is where the relaxation of test functions in Definition 3.4 is needed.
Therefore 0 ≥ (ϕι(ηι) −Mϕι(ηι))∗ = u(ηι) − (Mu)∗(ηι,k(ι)). We already
know v,δ(ξι+α)−Mv,δ(ξι+α) ≥ 12ρ. Combining these facts with our previous
observations yields
u(ηι)− v,δ(ξι + α) < (Mu)∗(ηι,k(ι))−Mv(ξι + α)− 1
2
ρ.
Wemay even pass to a maximizing sequence {ηι,k(ι),l(ι)}ι such that I(ηι,k(ι),l(ι)) 6=
∅ and Mu(ηι,k(ι),l(ι)) = (Mu)∗(ηι,k(ι)) + o(ι−1) and ηι,k(ι),l(ι) = ηι + o(ι−1).
Note that |ηι− ξι| → 0 implies that for ι sufficiently large ηι,k(ι),l(ι) ≤ ξι +α.
Therefore, I(ξι + α) 6= ∅. It follows that Mv(ξι + α) > −∞.
Step 8. All the ingredients are now present to derive the desired contradiction.
As we have already seen
u(ηι) ≤Mu(ηι,k(ι),l(ι)) + o(ι−1)
and
v,δ(ξι + α)−Mv,δ(ξι + α) ≥ ρ
2
.
We proceed to write
mι = u(ηι)− v,δ(ξι + α)− 1
2
ι|ηι − ξι|2
≤Mu(ηι,k(ι),l(ι))−Mv,δ(ξι + α)− ρ
2
− 1
2
ι|ηι − ξι|2 + o(ι−1)
≤ sup
ν∈I(ηι,k(ι),l(ι))
{u(ηι,k(ι),l(ι) + ν)− v,δ(ξι + α+ ν)} − 1
2
ι|ηι − ξι|2 − ρ
2
+ o(ι−1)
= sup
ν∈I(ηkιι )
{u(ηι,k(ι),l(ι) + ν)− v,δ(ξι + αν)− 1
2
ι|ηι,k(ι),l(ι) − ξι|2} − ρ
2
+
1
2
ι|ηι,k(ι),l(ι) − ξι|2 − 1
2
ι|ηι − ξι|2 + o(ι−1)
≤ mι + 1
2
ι(|ηι,k(ι),l(ι) − ξι|2 − |ηι − ξι|2) + o(ι−1)− ρ
2
≤ mι − ρ
2
+ o(1),
which yields the contradiction.
5 Numerical results
In this section, we construct and implement algorithms to determine the no-trade
region and optimal strategies at the leading order. The approximate solutions
are obtained by homogenization as λf , λp → 0. This technique has been applied
successfully to the study of the Merton problem under various frictions. The
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method entails expanding the frictional value function as a series in λf , λp
around the frictionless Merton value function. The technique requires that the
frictionless value function is finite (this is a standing assumption).
One of the virtues of analysing the asymptotic problem numerically, apart
from reduction of dimensionality, is the fact that the no-trade region is bounded
in each iso-wealth plane. Therefore, if this region is contained in the computation
domain, the control will be active at the boundary, rendering the boundary
conditions immaterial.
5.1 The frictionless problem
We begin by considering the problem of investing and consuming in a setting
where there are no transaction costs. Since trades are then costless, the cor-
responding value function does not depend separately on the positions x, y in
the safe and the risky assets, but only on total wealth z = x + y · 1d. As is
well known (cf., e.g., [17, Chapter X]), the frictionless value function solves the
dynamic programming equation
0 = U˜
(
vz(z)
)− βv(z) +L0v(z), (5.1)
where
L0v(z) = vz(z)zr + vz(z)(µ− r1d) · θ(z) + 1
2
vzz(z)|σ>θ(z)|2, (5.2)
and the corresponding optimal consumption rate and optimal risky positions are
given by
κ(z) = (U ′)−1
(
vz(z)
)
(5.3)
and
θ(z) := − vz(z)
vzz(z)
(σσ>)−1(µ− r1d). (5.4)
5.2 Homogenization
Before embarking on a full asymptotic analysis, it will be convenient at this
stage to rewrite λf = 4 and λp = νp3. We choose this parametrization so that
all the forthcoming expansions contain only integral powers of . We will also
abuse notation and write v := vλ.
Define the fast-variable in the expansion as
ξ =
y − θ(z)

,
Since we perform an inner expansion in the no-trade region, we scaled ξ by the
width of the no-trade region. Standard heuristic arguments can be applied to
guess that width should be on the order of  = λ1/4f ∝ λ1/3p . An informed guess
yields the ansatz
v(x, y) = v(z)− 2u(z)− 4w(z, ξ) + o(3).
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Formally substituting the ansatz into the DPE gives rise to the so-called corrector
equations for u and w. The DPE is comprised of two parts, an elliptic part and
a non-local part and they require separate expansions.
5.2.1 Expansion in no-trade region
The elliptic expression has already been approximated to leading order in a
number of papers, e.g. [1]. The same computation yields
βv(x, y)− U˜(vx(x, y))−L v(x, y)
= −2
(
βu(z)−L0u(z) + κ(z)uz(z) + |σ
>ξ|2
2
vzz(z)
− 1
2
Tr[α(z)α(z)>wξξ(z, ξ)]
)
+ o(2),
for the differential operator L0 from (5.2) and
α(z) = (Id − θz(z)1>d )diag [θ(z)]σ.
Satisfying the elliptic part of equation (2.4) between bulk trades—at the leading
order O(2)—is therefore tantamount to
0 = βu(z)−L0u(z)+κ(z)uz(z)+ |σ
>ξ|2
2
vzz(z)−1
2
Tr[α(z)α(z)>wξξ(z, ξ)]. (5.5)
5.2.2 Expansion in trade region
By definition, v ≥Mv holds at all points of the domain. Inserting the ansatz,
this reads
v(z)− 2u(z)− 4w(z, ξ) + o(3) ≥ sup
ξˆ
{
v(zˆ)− 2u(zˆ)− 4w(zˆ, ξˆ)
}
,
where
zˆ = z − 4 − νp3‖yˆ − y‖1 = z − 4(1 + νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1)
and where the supremum is taken over admissible portfolio positions ξˆ with
wealth zˆ. If w is smooth, then w(zˆ, ξˆ) = w(z, ξˆ) + o(3). Proceeding formally,
we observe
0 ≥ sup
ξˆ
{
v(zˆ)− v(z)− 2(u(zˆ)− u(z))− 4(w(zˆ, ξˆ)− w(z, ξ))
}
= 4 sup
ξˆ
{−vz(z)(1 + νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1) + w(z, ξ)− w(z, ξˆ)}+ o(4)
= 4
(
w(z, ξ)− vz(z)− inf
ξˆ
{vz(z)νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1 + w(z, ξˆ)}
)
+ o(4).
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Therefore, at the leading order w should satisfy
w(z, ξ) ≤ vz(z) + inf
ξ′
{vz(z)νp‖ξ′ − ξ‖1 + w(z, ξ′)} (5.6)
with equality holding in the trade region.
Remark 5.1. The condition (5.6) has an appealing interpretation. It was shown
in previous studies that the function w can be viewed as the potential in an ergodic
control problem. Since the cost of trading from ξ to ξˆ is (1 + νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1)4, the
leading order loss of utility from trading is
v(z)− v(zˆ) ≈ vz(z)(z − z′) = vz(z)(1 + νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1)4.
Thus, (5.6) implies that trades should occur precisely when the utility loss can be
offset by the change in potential w(z, ξ′)− w(z, ξ).
5.2.3 Corrector equations
Rewriting the DPE (2.4) using the formal expansion results yields a pair of
coupled equations called corrector equations. Given any z > 0, we wish to find
an unknown pair (a(z), w(z, ·)) ∈ R+ ×C2(Rd) which satisfies the first corrector
equation
max
{
1
2
|σ>ξ|2vzz(z)− 1
2
Tr
[
α(z)α(z)>wξξ(z, ξ)
]
+ a(z), (5.7)
w(z, ξ)− vz(z)− inf
ξˆ∈Rd
{
vz(z)νp‖ξˆ − ξ‖1 + w(z, ξˆ)
}}
= 0. (5.8)
A function a(z) is then obtained from the first corrector equation by solving
for every z > 0. The leading order term in the expansion of v is obtained by
solving for u(z) in the second corrector equation
βu(z)−L0u(z) + κ(z)u(z) = a(z), z ∈ R+.
5.3 Numerical method
As was alluded to earlier, the first corrector equation (5.7) arises from an ergodic
control problem. To be more precise, the problem is defined as follows. Find
a(z) given by
a(z) := inf
m,τ
J(z,m, τ)
where the cost functional J is defined by
J(z,m, τ) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[ ∫ T
0
−vzz(z) |σ
>ξs|2
2
ds
+ vz(z)
∞∑
k=1
(1 + νp‖m‖1)1{τk≤T}
]
,
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and the state process ξ = (ξt)t∈[0,∞) evolves according to
ξt = ξ0 + α(z)Bt +
∞∑
k=1
mk1{τk≤t}
for a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion B.
In a setting where the control is not of impulse type, it can be approximated
with controls which are absolutely continuous with respect to time. The problem
can then be discretized in a way which makes standard policy iteration techniques
apply. In fact, if done appropriately, the discrete HJB equation will be a
penalized version of the singular control counterpart. This is done implicitly in
[38]. Similarly, the goal in our setting is to approximate the impulse controls in
such a way that policy iteration gives the solution to a penalized version of the
first corrector equation.
The problem will be solved for fixed z, and as a starting point, the problem is
discretized in the remaining space variables as described in [8]. Any discretization
not explicitly stated here will follow that scheme. The impulse control is
discretized separately as described below, and the resulting controlled process is
then a continuous-time Markov chain for which a policy iteration scheme can be
implemented.
We denote by Lm the discretized infinitesimal generator of ξ on some grid,
corresponding to the feedback control m = (m1, . . . ,md). Here mi denotes the
distance to move in direction i, i.e., the number of grid points by which to move
times the mesh width in that dimension. Then Lm(ξ, ξ′) is the transition rate
from ξ to ξ′. Let Lm = L + LmK , where L is the operator corresponds to the
elliptic part of the equation, and LmK consists of additional terms arising when a
control is active. To account for the impulse control jumps, we set
LmK(ξ, ξ) = −K and LmK(ξ, ξ +m) = K
for some suitably large value of K. This is the operator of the ergodic control
problem above, but where jumps in the direction of the control do not happen
with certainty. Instead, conditioned on a jump occurring, the state moves in
the direction of the control with some probability which tends to 1 as K →∞.
Moreover, the probability making a jump in a given time interval also tends
to 1 as K → ∞ if the control is active. In this sense the K approximates the
singularity of the control.
Finally, by also discretizing the running cost, the problem is reformulated as
a continuous time Markov decision process for which standard policy iteration
techniques apply (cf., e.g., [40]). That is, compute
a(z) := inf
m
J(z,m),
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where J is the cost functional given by
J(z,m) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
E
[ ∫ T
0
−vzz(z) |σ
>ξs|2
2
+Kvz(z)(1 + νp‖m‖1)1{m 6=0}ds
]
,
subject to
ξt = ξ0 + Bˆ
α
t +
∑
s≤t
m(ξs)∆Ns
for a Poisson process N with rate K and where Bˆαt is the spatial discretization
of the process α(z)Bt corresponding to L. The DPE for this ergodic control
problem is precisely a discretization of the elliptic part of the first corrector
equation together with a penalization term for the trade condition, where the
penalty is K.
For a fixed wealth z, let D be a finite mesh on Rd, where d denotes the
number of risky assets. Denote by N the number of grid points in D and set
fm(ξ) := −vzz(z) |σ
>ξ|2
2
+Kvz(z)(1 + νp‖m‖1)1{m6=0}, ∀ξ ∈ D.
Naturally, since the computational domain D is finite, we must also specify
boundary conditions. If the probability of a controlled process reaching the
boundary is small enough, the boundary conditions have a negligible effect on the
final outcome. In fact, as mentioned above, if the no-trade region is contained
in the domain, and therefore the control active at the boundary, the effect of
the boundary conditions is even further diminished. To this end, D should be
sufficiently large that the continuation region is entirely contained in the interior
of D. That is, at all points on ∂D, the investor should want to trade into the
interior of D. The boundary conditions are then chosen so that Lm can still be
interpreted as a transition rate matrix (e.g. a homogeneous Neumann condition).
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Initialize a starting policy m0 ∈ Rd×N
and choose a starting value a0 > 0 sufficiently large. Then select a tolerance
level,4 τ ≥ 0 and iterate:
4We can even take τ = 0 since eventually ai = ai+1.
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Policy iteration algorithm
(i) Compute5 (w, ai+1) ∈ RN × R+ such that∑
ξ′∈D
Lmi(ξ, ξ′)w(ξ′) + fmi(ξ) = ai+1, ∀ξ ∈ D.
Halt if |ai − ai+1| ≤ τ .
(ii) For each ξ ∈ D, compute mi+1(ξ) where
mi+1(ξ) ∈ arg min
ξ+mˆ∈D
∑
ξ′∈D
Lmˆ(ξ, ξ′)w(ξ′) + f mˆ(ξ)
 .
(iii) Return to step (i).
5.4 Interpretation of results
Henceforth, the number of assets will be either 1 or 2.
In the results below we will use the following notation unless otherwise stated.
The returns of the assets are given by µ1 and µ2, i.e.,
µ =
[
µ1
µ2
]
.
The covariance matrix is defined through the variances σ1, σ2, and the correlation
ρ by
σσ> =
[
σ21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ2
]
.
As in the previous sections, r is the interest rate, β denotes the impatience
rate, and γ is the elasticity of the CRRA utility function
U(c) =
{
c1−γ
1−γ , γ 6= 0,
ln c, γ = 0.
The asymptotic problem is solved in the ξ-space for fixed z. To make a
meaningful interpretation of the result, we think of this as the solution in ξ-space
for some non-zero level of  > 0. With this interpretation, the transaction
costs are precisely λf = 4 and λp = νp3. The value of  only enters in the
interpretation and the choice only affects the relationship between the two
5The boundary conditions on D are chosen such that ∑ξ′∈D Lm(ξ, ξ′) = 0 for all ξ ∈ D.
Since the system is underdetermined, wj can be normalized so that w(0) = 0 without modifying
the equations.
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transaction costs and the wealth level. To simplify interpretation it is chosen so
that λf = 1 and λp = νp. The relative deviation is given by ξ/z.
Finally, the two-dimensional figures are cuts in planes where the wealth level
z is fixed. The colors carry information about how to optimally trade, and their
meanings are given in the table below.
white no trading
yellow trading in asset 1
red trading in asset 2
orange trading in both assets
Whether buying or selling is optimal is not indicated by the color since the
optimal strategy always moves the portfolio closer to the Merton proportion.
This is visualized by the black points, which are the points to which the investor
chooses to trade.
5.5 Benchmark testing
Since the DPE of the discrete problem is the equation of a penalized version
of the impulse control problem, we expect that solutions will converge to those
of the first corrector equation. We will not undertake a rigorous convergence
analysis here. Instead, we demonstrate that solutions computed by the scheme
agree with available analytical benchmarks. These benchmarks include: fixed and
proportional costs in one dimension as well as only fixed costs in two dimensions.
In one dimension with both fixed and proportional transaction costs it is
possible to find an analytic characterization of the first corrector equation.
This is accomplished by using a smooth fit condition between a fourth order
polynomial inside the trade region and linear growth outside, and then solve for
the polynomial coefficients as well as the free boundary. A comparison between
this analytic solution and the policy iteration result is found in Figure 3. The
two solutions coincide to any extent discernible.
In the two-dimensional setting, the trading strategy is analytically known in
the absence of proportional transaction costs (cf. [1]). In Figure 4, the analytic
free boundary is plotted on top of the iterative solution and the fit is near
perfect. Moreover, the analytic solution tells us that all trades are to the Merton
proportion, and we verify that this is indeed also the result from policy iteration.
Note that the long-term distribution in the second case does not coincide
with any of the main axes of the ellipse describing the no-trade region. We
attribute this to the fact that the risk aversion and market parameters induce
a frictionless trader to keep 8.6 times more of the wealth in asset one (vertical
axis) than in asset two (horizontal axis). Thus, most of the fluctuation of the
portfolio position will be in the corresponding direction. This information is
incorporated in the matrix α>α. Indeed,
α>α ≈
[
42607.9 669.990
669.990 147.787
]
.
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Figure 3: Known analytic solution plotted alongside the policy iteration solution
for two different parameter configurations.
Hence, the volatility of ξ1 is around 288 times larger than that of ξ2, and the
correlation is approximately 10−4.
5.6 Proportional transaction costs
In the setting of only proportional transaction costs, Figure 5 shows the bound-
aries of the trade regions with changing covariance matrix. For comparison with
[36], we here define the covariance matrix through
σ =
[
0.4− κ κ
κ 0.4− κ
]
,
where κ is −0.1, −0.05, 0, 0.025, 0.05 and 0.075. Here the interpretation of  is
such that λp = 0.02, i.e., such that we have proportional transaction costs of 2
%. Note that due to homotheticity exhibited by the proportional cost problem,
this only affects the size of the region, since the relative deviation is independent
of the wealth level. Observe that the regions are not convex.
5.7 Mixed transaction costs
Introducing an additional transaction cost to either of the above problems induces
a situation where the investor has to balance the proportional cost associated
with trading distance with the fixed cost induced by initiating a trade. This
leads to an optimal strategy characterized by a trading boundary and a target
curve. When the portfolio exits the no-trade region, i.e., reaches the trading
boundary, the optimal action is to rebalance the portfolio such that the new
position is at the target curve.
Examples of such strategies are represented in Figure 6. In particular, the
shape resembles the shape with only proportional costs, but with the corners
35 Fixed and Proportional Costs
−0.1 0 0.1
−0.1
0
0.1
Numerical solution
−0.1 0 0.1
−0.1
0
0.1
Analytical solution
−0.1 0 0.1
−0.1
0
0.1
Comparison
−0.1 0 0.1
−0.1
0
0.1
Long-term portfolio distribution
−0.02 0 0.02
−0.02
0
0.02
Numerical solution
−0.02 0 0.02
−0.02
0
0.02
Analytical solution
−0.02 0 0.02
−0.02
0
0.02
Comparison
−0.02 0 0.02
−0.02
0
0.02
Long-term portfolio distribution
Figure 4: Two comparisons of numerical and analytical solutions, plotted as deviations
from the Merton proportions in percentages of wealth held in the risky assets. The
blue centers are heatmaps (and level sets) of the (simulated) long-term distribution of
portfolio positions.
rel. pos. β γ r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ λf λp z
Top 1 2 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 -0.75 $ 1 0% $ 12’345.67
Bottom 1 7 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.4 0.2 0.35 $ 1 0% $ 12’345.67
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κ = −0.1
κ = 0.075
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Figure 5: Trade region boundaries with purely proportional transaction costs as
the correlation parameter κ attains the values −0.1, −0.05, 0, 0.025, 0.05 and
0.075. The risk free rate is 3%, µ = (0.08, 0.08), γ = 2, and the transaction cost
is 2 %.
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rounded, reminiscent of the fixed cost problem. The selection of figures display
how the no-trade region changes with variations in the market parameters, all
other things being equal. The qualitative effect of such variations is very similar
to in the proportional transaction cost problem.
At low wealth levels, fixed transaction costs are the predominant cost consid-
eration whereas at higher wealth levels proportional costs prevail. Indeed, the
results of our computational scheme exhibit these same phenomena. Figures 7
and 8 show the no-trade region as wealth varies ceteris paribus. In the 2-d case,
the no-trade region appears to interpolate between the elliptic shape associated
to fixed costs at low wealth levels and the parallelogram shape associated to
proportional costs at high wealth levels. Note also that the total transaction costs
are comparatively smaller for a wealthier agent, resulting in smaller no-trade
regions in relation to wealth. The 1-d plots in Figure 8 illustrate precisely the z
dependence of the optimal trigger and optimal restart barriers.
The results indicate that when proportional costs are present, the no-trade
region is not always convex. Indeed, Figure 7 suggests that non-convexity can
persist at all wealth levels. This is in stark contrast to the case where there are
only fixed costs and the corresponding approximate no-trade region is an ellipse
at every level of wealth.
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Figure 6: Market parameter dependence as deviations in percentages of wealth.
rel. pos. β γ r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ λf λp z
Top left 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Top right 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Middle left 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Middle right 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 -0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Bottom left 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.3 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Bottom right 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.4 0.3 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
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Figure 7: Strategy wealth dependence described as deviations from the Merton
portfolio, in units of wealth. The series of figures shows the transition between
the two regimes of cost structures. A comparison to Figure 4 and Figure 5
emphasizes the resemblance to purely fixed and purely proportional costs in the
extreme cases of wealth.
rel. pos. β γ r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ λf λp z
Top left 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 100
Top right 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 1’000
Bottom left 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 50’000
Bottom right 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 5’000’000
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Figure 8: The plots illustrate the wealth dependence of the optimal trading
boundary and trading targets as deviations from the Merton portfolio in units
of wealth. The converging lines in the bottom right figure clearly show the
transition from a fixed cost regime for low wealth to the proportional cost regime
as wealth increases.
β γ r σ µ λf λp
1 5 0.01 0.2 0.04 $ 1 3 %
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5.8 Two fixed costs with two risky assets
Appropriately modifying the cost structure in the computational scheme enables
us to experiment with more general scenarios. For example, we now wish to
examine the no-trade region and optimal strategies when multiple fixed costs are
levied for trading sets of assets. In the following examples, a fixed transaction
cost of $1 is paid for each one of the risky positions rebalanced as opposed to
paying a flat fee for re-balancing an entire portfolio of assets. As a result, we are
able to not only consider a more realistic scenario in which fixed costs are paid
per asset, but we also gain a richer understanding of the interaction between the
different cost structures and how that is manifested in the optimal strategies.
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−0.05 0 0.05
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0
0.05
Figure 9: Trading two assets incurs two fixed costs, splitting up the target
boundary depending on direction of trades. The blue path is a simulation of a
portfolio starting in the upper left corner, visualizing the optimal strategy.
rel. pos. β γ r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ λf λp z
Top left 1 5 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.4 0.3 -0.65 $ 1 1.5% $ 1’000
Top right 1 5 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.50 $ 1 0% $ 1’000
Bottom left 1 5 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 1’000
Bottom right 1 5 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.60 $ 1 3% $ 1’000
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A clear departure from the previous results is the fact that the inner(restart)
region is composed of two pairs of lines in the case λp > 0 which eventually
entirely overlap when λp = 0. Upon close inspection, the mapping of the
outer boundary to the inner boundary becomes perfectly clear. The yellow
region maps orthogonally to the closest horizontal line and the red region maps
orthogonally to the closest vertical line. Finally, orange maps to the closest
point of intersection of the pairs of lines. The relative widths behave intuitively,
as before, according to the correlation and volatilities of the assets. One of
the most interesting phenomena is the pinching of the no-trade region that
occurs around the ±(ξ1 + ξ2) directions in the case of positive correlation and
±(ξ1 − ξ2) directions in the case of negative correlation (although not illustrated
here, there is no such phenomena in the uncorrelated case and the region is
perfectly symmetric across the horizontal and vertical axes). Let us take for
example the extreme looking case in the bottom right image of Figure 9. In this
case, the investor would rather allow their portfolio to deviate a lot further along
the ξ1 + ξ2 axis through the optimal Merton proportion (than perhaps one might
expect) than to be transacting in just one (or both) of the assets. Moreover, a
slight deviation off that axis seems to incur an additional quadratic cost loss as
it immediately leads the investor to trade in one of the two assets.
5.9 Long-term distribution
By simulating the excursions of the stocks in ξ-space and following the optimal
strategy found above, it is possible to generate the long term distributions of
portfolio positions. In Figure 10 these distributions are pictured as heatmaps
where white means more time is spent at a point, and blue means less. The
target positions, i.e., the positions to which we choose to trade, previously drawn
as black lines, shine brighter and are clearly distinguishable. As expected, more
time is spent alone the shorter axis due to the positive correlation. This is
especially evident in Figure 4 where the correlation parameter ρ is very large.
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Figure 10: Long-term distribution of the optimal portfolio position, visualized by
the probability density. These are shown as heatmaps, level sets, and as density
surfaces.
rel. pos. β γ r µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 ρ λf λp z
Top 1 3 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 10’000
Bottom 1 5 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.4 0.4 0.30 $ 1 3% $ 1’000
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